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The dark and bright sides of hubris: Conceptual implications for 
leadership and governance research 
Abstract: Hubris among corporate leaders has recently gained much academic attention, with 
strategy and corporate governance research focusing mainly on negative aspects, such as overreach 
by strategic leaders during acquisitions. However, adjacent disciplines including entrepreneurship 
and innovation identify positive consequences too. How comparable are these findings? Appraising 
the conceptual and methodological approaches, we find that while the hubris concept has many 
strengths, several challenges remain. We suggest conceptual and empirical research directions 
aimed at increasing construct clarity, validating the hubris construct, and extending the scope of 
hubris research. We also propose that research with boards and top management teams can help 
clarify how they make decisions to cope with the “dark side” of hubris without suppressing “bright 
side” outcomes.  
Keywords: Hubris, overconfidence, board monitoring, construct clarity, mergers and acquisitions 
Introduction 
The collapse in 2008 of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) during the global financial crisis may 
have been in part a result of weak corporate governance. But there are reasons to believe that 
psychological factors also played a role in this specific case. RBS arguably failed at least in part 
because of the board’s excessive confidence in the talent of its chief executive in identifying and 
executing acquisitions. The last – leading a consortium in 2007 to acquire the Dutch bank ABN 
Amro – left RBS highly leveraged and thus more vulnerable when its US-based acquisitions fell 
victim to the horrors of subprime mortgages (FSA, 2011). 
It could be surmised that the ABN Amro bid was not obviously in shareholders’ interests 
even before disaster struck. The rival bidder was Barclays, and the competition between them 
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ratcheted up the cost of the acquisition. Barclays was a domestic rival of RBS in the UK market 
for banking services and an international rival in investment banking. But its base of mainstream, 
long-term shareholders was largely the same institutional investors as for RBS (Burgess, 2007a; 
Burgess, 2007b). The more each bank bid, the worse off joint shareholders of both banks would 
be. If the deal was not for shareholder value, then it must have had a different motivation. With the 
benefit of hindsight, one such motivation may well have been excessive confidence – of the CEO, 
and of the board and senior managers – in short, hubris, and the tolerance of it. 
But does this tale tell the whole story? Only a few years earlier, RBS had bought the much 
larger National Westminster Bank – a coup followed by a highly successful integration with 
substantial cost savings – and then acquired large retail banking operations across the United States. 
That is, largely the same management team that failed so badly in 2007-08 had established a track 
record of audacious takeovers – to acclaim. 
In recent years, and especially since the financial crisis, hubris has attracted considerable 
attention (Berglas, 2014; Claxton et al., 2015; de Haan, 2015; Haynes et al., 2015). The word 
“hubris” conjures up images from Greek mythology of Icarus, with his  wings of wax and feathers, 
flying too close to the sun and falling to his death (Petit and Bollaert, 2012). It has been called “a 
potentially dangerous cocktail of over-confidence, over-ambition, arrogance and pride” (Sadler-
Smith et al., 2017). Attempts to analyze it rely more prosaically use a definition of “exaggerated 
self-confidence” (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997: 103). 
Yet the concept of hubris is elusive and contested, which has given rise to a variety of 
specific constructs in empirical research to capture hubris. This research overwhelmingly – though 
not entirely – regards hubris as a negative phenomenon: executive excess and self-serving behavior 
(Rus et al., 2012) and director negligence (FSA, 2011) in monitoring their work. But hubris appears 
to have beneficial effects, as we explore below, in some empirical studies of innovation and 
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entrepreneurship, on facets of the creative work of executives, and on the “service” function of 
directors.  
This article uses studies on hubris across management fields to deconstruct its dimensions 
and assess hubris against criteria for concept evaluation. We examine its treatment in the empirical 
literature on strategic decision-making, identifying the conceptual variation and differing 
approaches to constructs and measurement. Next, we evaluate the concept against the criteria 
established by Gerring (1999). This evaluation contributes to the leadership and corporate 
governance literatures by clarifying terms and understanding the range of constructs in use. It also 
highlights several strengths of the hubris concept and illuminates an agenda for overcoming its 
weaknesses in research on strategic leadership, the broad field where strategic management and 
corporate governance meet.  
Hubris in management research 
Scholars have shown considerable interest in the impact of hubris on management decisions, such 
as acquisitions (Billett and Qian, 2008; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Li and Tang, 2010; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986), startup businesses (Hayward 
et al., 2010; Simon and Shrader, 2012), and innovation (Vecchio, 2003; Englmaier, 2010). One of 
the first treatments of the hubris hypothesis was Roll’s (1986) application of it to mergers and 
acquisitions – and hubris research has since gained importance as it also integrates findings from 
organizational behavior (Campbell et al., 2011; Claxton et al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2015; Fast et 
al., 2012; Ford, 2006) and psychology (Anderson et al., 2008; Owen and Davidson, 2009). 
Some scholars label hubris a “colloquial concept,” lacking sound methodological 
underpinnings (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005: 298). Moreover, there may be significant overlaps with 
existing constructs such as narcissism (Campbell et al., 2011; Rijsenbilt and Commandeur, 2013), 
core self-evaluations (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005), and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 
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2005a; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). These constructs can inform business practice, for example, 
by serving as criteria for recruiting senior executives and board members, or by constituting 
elements subject to performance evaluation. Conflating them with hubris might lead to poor 
decisions. Nevertheless, rich empirical evidence on hubris suggests that this concept can add value, 
provided that its weaknesses can be overcome (Picone et al., 2014). 
Trait-based literature on leadership generally adopts a negative, “dark side,” interpretation 
of hubris (Claxton et al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2015; Petit and Bollaert, 2012), and similar work 
informs practitioner evaluations of senior managers and teams (Hogan Assessments, 2018; 
Douglas et al., 2012). Drawing on interpretations of the actions of political leaders in a medical 
journal, Owen and Davidson (2009) diagnose what they term the “hubris syndrome” as a 
combination of aspects of three known personality disorders: the anti-social, the histrionic, and the 
narcissistic, together with several characteristics unique to hubris.1 Hubris is also discussed as the 
“dark underbelly” of leadership (Goldman, 2009: 11) and as an outcome of destructive leadership 
(Thoroughgood et al., 2018). Where a “bright side” appears, it comes either as a balancing trait of 
another actor against the hubris of the leader (Kets de Vries, 1990) or as another trait of the leader 
that helps to overcome the effects of hubris. 
As argued by Judge et al. (2009: 870), “As leaders, those with hubris are likely to project 
power, strength, and authority in difficult situations, inspiring confidence among their followers 
and peers.” This is echoed in leadership studies, where “authenticity” is an antidote to hubris 
(Bodolica and Spraggon, 2011; Tracy and Robins, 2007). Judge et al. (2009) posit another view, 
one where “dark side” (socially undesirable) traits may have “bright side” effects if a forceful leader 
takes control of an ambiguous situation and accepts responsibility.  
Corporate governance research employs the concept mainly in the context of risk in 
strategic decisions (e.g., Aktas et al., 2016), praise for early successes (Lawrence et al., 2011), 
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exceptional share buy-backs or other forms of executive overreach (e.g., Rost and Osterloh, 2010; 
Shu et al., 2013). Such studies emphasize the “control” perspective in governance, anchored in 
agency theory. In contrast, Zhang et al. (2016) resonate with the literature on entrepreneurship and 
innovation, finding that investors are more willing to trust younger CEOs than older ones. Some 
articles point to the monitoring function of independent boards (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012; 
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), while others focus on enhanced shareholder interventions (Pirson 
and Turnbull, 2011), which deter managerial excess or punish it after the fact. A separate stream 
of research concerns the effects of such excess: in particular, frequent under-performance after 
mergers and acquisitions (Bethel et al., 2009; Nogata et al., 2011; Zhu, 2013). 
These findings point normatively to structural mechanisms that may contain the negative 
impact of hubris (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015b). Aktas, Croci, and Simsir (2016) highlight 
potential cost savings that strong governance mechanisms can generate in the takeover market, 
whereas Hayward and Hambrick (1997) identify the moderating effect of board vigilance in 
takeovers. Board vigilance is also required in day-to-day activities because hubristic managers 
perceive illegal activities as less risky, i.e., hubris is empirically linked to the probability of 
engaging in illegal behavior (Mishina et al., 2010). 
However, the leadership and governance literatures have largely overlooked how hubris is 
treated in entrepreneurship and innovation, with links to the boundary-spanning role of outside, 
non-executive directors associated with the “service” perspective in corporate governance (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Focusing on that direction can provide a more rounded view of executive 
overconfidence and boards. 
Empirical evidence related to hubris 
As detailed summaries of the hubris literature are available (Picone et al., 2014; Bollaert and Petit, 
2010; Sadler-Smith et al., 2017), we only briefly highlight key empirical findings that help us 
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understand the conceptual challenges. In particular, we aim to understand whether, and to what 
degree, these findings are comparable. This review points to three types of strategic decisions 
where hubris is often depicted: mergers and acquisitions, entrepreneurship, and innovation. It is 
important to note that, in most instances, decisions of the most senior corporate managers are 
analyzed. 
The “dark side” interpretation of hubris is evident in the literature on mergers and 
acquisitions. Early work developed the theoretical argument that hubris is negatively associated 
with acquisition success (Roll, 1986). Results of subsequent empirical studies support the 
hypothesis that hubris is associated with CEOs paying higher premiums for acquisitions, associated 
with lower stock market returns (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Several studies show that 
hubristic CEOs are more likely to engage in acquisitions and that these CEOs tend to make value-
destroying acquisition decisions (Brown and Sarma, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Serial 
acquirers destroy shareholder wealth in later acquisitions, particularly when first acquisitions were 
successful (Billett and Qian, 2008) – implying that hubris often develops over time (Raj and 
Forsyth, 2003), thus becoming an acquired disorder (Sadler-Smith et al., 2017). 
In contrast, the entrepreneurship literature points to important psychological differences 
between entrepreneurs and managers of large corporations. Entrepreneurs show greater 
overconfidence (overestimating the probability of being right) and representativeness (generalizing 
upon small non-random samples) than top managers (Busenitz and Barney, 1997), sometimes with 
the benefit of leading to quick decisions to exploit transient opportunities (Hayward et al., 2010). 
Baron (2000) suggests that entrepreneurs are less likely to engage in counterfactual thinking (i.e., 
to think about what might have been if they had decided differently). In uncertain, complex 
environments, a lack of counterfactual thinking facilitates the entrepreneurs’ decision to start a 
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business (a beneficial effect), but may also lead to insufficient analysis, which reduces the chances 
of success (Simon and Shrader, 2012). 
Similarly, many individuals begin new ventures despite high risks of failure (Vecchio, 
2003; Zahra et al., 2006). Camerer and Lovallo (1999: 307) examine alternative explanations and 
among them, specifically, reference group neglect – i.e., that many startup decisions are mistakes 
caused by overconfidence. This effect is consistent with the proposition that overconfident 
individuals put a disproportionate amount of weight on their own judgment as opposed to objective 
information. Wickham (2006) shows in an experimental setting that overconfident individuals trust 
their own judgment over the views of others. Hence, entrepreneurs do not seek more risk than other 
managers; they perceive less risk (Vecchio, 2003). From the outside, such behavior may appear 
irrational. Nonetheless, and even though many new businesses fail, such new ventures benefit 
society because they often lead to innovations that increase social welfare (Bernardo and Welch, 
2001). For some entrepreneurs, this “irrationality” leads to successful businesses that make them 
very rich too. Thus, entrepreneurial, hubristic overconfidence can have desirable side effects. 
Finally, we also see parallels in research on managers’ pursuit of innovation, where hubris 
may have desirable effects due to uncertainty, complexity, and long feedback delays (Hayward et 
al., 2006). Hiring an overconfident manager can signal commitment to research and development 
(Englmaier, 2010). Overconfident managers can be effective in convincing investors and 
employees to support investments in innovation (Vecchio, 2003) in both large, public corporations 
and small firms. The effect of overconfidence on managerial innovation is stronger in innovative 
industries (Hirshleifer et al., 2012) and competitive industries (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011), but 
weaker where the environment is more munificent and complex (Tang et al., 2015a). Based on a 
wide-ranging review, we selected illustrative studies that show the diversity of hubris measures 
and findings within each strand of the literature. Appendix 1 provides an overview of studies falling 
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into each one of the three main strands in hubris research: acquisitions/financial decisions, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation. To bring greater clarity to the research constructs in use, we need 
first to examine the concept of hubris.  
Concept Evaluation 
Suddaby (2010) has argued that construct clarity is frequently underdeveloped in management 
research. Expressions in common use are often employed with differing technical meanings. That 
can have advantages in emerging research areas, where exploratory work seeks to firm up a more 
loosely understood concept and seeks to identify possibly significant dimensions, but it also 
prevents the comparability of findings and hence the accumulation of knowledge.  
This highlights a subtle distinction between “concepts” and “constructs.” Constructs convey 
measurement of latent variables, whereas concepts may simply refer to theoretical ideas. Following 
this line of thought, Podsakoff et al. (2016: 161) define concepts as abstract cognitive symbols that 
are “generally not directly observable” and for which “we can only obtain indirect evidence of its 
relationships with other concepts through its operationalization.” Thus, “constructs” can be seen as 
elaborations of “concepts,” once the concept itself has achieved greater clarity.  
This suggests that before scholars can proceed to, and accumulate, detailed empirical 
examination, concepts themselves need evaluation. Gerring (1999) has proposed a set of eight 
criteria to assess strengths and shortcomings of concepts used in the social sciences (see Table 1). 
While noting tradeoffs in Gerring’s framework, Bjørnskov and Sønderskov (2013) defend it 
because it allows for a balanced view of relevant criteria, while taking into account that certain 
criteria (e.g., coherence) are more important than others (e.g., resonance). Moreover, because 
failure to meet one or more criteria implies low concept quality or validity, “the framework does 
not lead to an ‘anything goes situation’” (Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013: 1227). 
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Based on Gerring’s framework and in light of Bjørnskov and Sønderskov’s appraisal, we 
use the term “hubris concept” when depicting theoretical interpretation and the term “hubris 
construct” when discussing measurement and empirical results. The next sections apply Gerring’s 
eight criteria to identify strengths and shortcomings of the hubris concept. 
****   INSERT Table 1 about here   **** 
Parsimony and Coherence: Measuring Hubris 
According to Gerring (1999), parsimony relates to economy in the defining attributes of a concept, 
and coherence to the logical link between instances and attributes. Both have direct implications 
for measurement. We first review measures that researchers have employed to capture hubris in 
their empirical works. Then we make an assessment in relation to the two criteria. 
We acknowledge that taking direct measures, i.e., through surveys, is not always feasible. 
Many studies of hubris focus on top management and especially CEOs, as their effects are most 
dramatic. But CEOs rarely participate in studies that would enable the researcher to administer 
questionnaires containing items for direct measurement. A noteworthy recent exception to this rule 
is Peterson et al. (2012), who combine CEO self-reported measures of narcissism, such as the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) and observer ratings of CEOs’ narcissism, at different 
points in time. Additionally, social psychologists treating hubris as a trait apply the well-validated, 
widely used NPI to assess narcissism (Ackerman et al., 2011). Based on the argument that the 
upper end of the core self-evaluations (CSE) scale – the so called hyper-CSE –  is a good reflection 
of hubris (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005), CSE is another example for direct measurement but its 
popularity has not been prominent in hubris research so far.  CSEs are the higher-order 
combinations of self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control. 
Overall, such a direct approach to measurement offers a more precise way of measuring hubris than 
the so-called unobtrusive measures discussed next.  
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Management research investigating CEO hubris (or the related construct of narcissism) 
frequently relies on indirect measures. Several unobtrusive measures, i.e., observable proxies that 
supposedly reflect various elements of the hubris constructs, have been recommended (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997). They include linguistic choices of top managers (Amernic and Craig, 2013; 
Amernic and Craig, 2017), descriptions of CEOs in the business press, the cash compensation 
differential between the CEO and the second-best paid employee, recent success as measured by 
standard financial indicators, and photographs appearing in annual reports (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007). Measures based on media portrayals assume that CEOs internalize their celebrity 
status (Hayward et al., 2004). 
Similarly, studies in behavioral finance have developed a range of hubris indicators (Billett 
and Qian, 2008; Brown and Sarma, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). For example, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) identify hubristic CEOs as those who hold their stock options even when they are 
already “in the money,” indicating a belief in their ability to achieve future high performance. Deal 
frequency measures have also been used (Billett and Qian, 2008). 
Such unobtrusive measures are now widely used in the literature. They have also been 
combined with direct assessments of the CEO. For example, Mezias and Starbuck (2003) assess 
perceptions using the calibration approach to reveal that hubristic managers perceive their 
organizational environment differently. Other works exploit the deviation between self-reported 
and objective performance evaluation, using the difference between earnings forecasts and actual 
earnings as a hubris indicator (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015b). 
However, it is unclear whether such proxies measure hubris precisely. At best, the “hubris” 
interpretation of these proxies is only one possible interpretation. Additionally, particular care is 
needed when the hubris measure is based on a firm’s level of performance and linked to firm 
success to avoid the danger of being tautological. While we acknowledge the benefits of 
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unobtrusive measures when analyzing hubris in large samples, we also realize that their usage is 
subject to criticism. Consequently, a more precise measurement of the hubris construct is needed.  
In conclusion, with regard to parsimony, we argue that hubris scores rather low. This is due 
to the overlap of hubris with related constructs. For example, if as argued by Hiller and Hambrick 
(2005), the high end of the CSE scale is a good reflection of hubris, its list of attributes increases 
and becomes a mix of the four underlying CSE traits. Similar rationales apply to hubris when 
understood as a variant of narcissistic personality attributes.  
Similarly, hubris scores low on the coherence dimension. First, its unobtrusive measures 
can be criticized as discussed previously. Second, some sub-dimensions embedded in the CSE 
scale, such as locus of control or emotional stability, do not contribute much to the hubris construct, 
whereas the dimensions self-esteem and self-efficacy appear to be strongly related. Third, 
conceptualizing hubris as narcissism and CSE implies considering it as a trait, or at a minimum as 
displaying trait-based properties, which stands at odds with increasing its coherence. Defining the 
hubris construct as a mix of narcissism and CSEs also requires direct measures. 
Familiarity: Understanding Hubris 
Hubris is a familiar term; is it widely used in lay, professional, and academic circles. A common 
point of departure for management research (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), and in behavioral 
economics and finance (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a), is Roll’s (1986) depiction of hubris as an 
important driver of mergers and acquisitions. Roll (1986) suggests that CEOs unconsciously 
overestimate their abilities, often overpaying for acquisitions. This “hubris hypothesis” has become 
an important explanation for acquisition motives (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 
2000; Seth et al., 2002). It also creates a link to behavioral decision research (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) because takeover decisions affected by hubris are conceived as acts arising in non-
rational ways. 
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Early academic works relied on a common dictionary definition (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Roll, 1986). Petit and Bollaert (2012: 266) further developed the concept to a construct with 
three cognitive dimensions: a “grandiose sense of self,” a sense of superiority, and the conviction 
that they can operate outside the common rules and laws. They suggest these cognitive dimensions 
manifest themselves in behavior involving grandiose communication style, poor decisions, and 
entrenchment. These dimensions seem to have overlaps as superiority, a sense of being above the 
law, and grandiosity could be difficult to separate conceptually as well as empirically. 
Yet such attempts to make the concept more precise hit obstacles by attempting to define 
its dimensions and in disagreement over more general meaning. For example, Bodolica and 
Spraggon (2011) follow Tracy and Robins (2007) in distinguishing between “hubristic” and 
“authentic” pride. While the authentic type describes the justly proud, hubristic pride “is caused by 
an individual’s faulty belief in constant personal success and supremacy of self over others, 
disregarding the particular conditions surrounding the self” (Bodolica and Spraggon, 2011: 539). 
Some researchers use hubris and overconfidence interchangeably. For example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008: 42) equate them: “A key contribution of our analysis is to directly 
measure which CEOs are prone to overconfidence (or hubris).” Others draw a distinction. In 
Bollaert and Petit (2010) and Hayward and Hambrick (1997), overconfidence is more neutral, 
while hubris has the negative connotation of excessive pride that comes before the fall. Still others, 
such as Shipman and Mumford (2011: 649), declare, “hubris includes overconfidence, but also 
extends beyond just overconfidence into constructs like pride and self-worth.” Given the reasoning 
above, we attribute fairly high scores on the familiarity assessment criterion for the hubris concept, 
while acknowledging imprecisions in meaning, which we examine next.  
14 
 
Differentiation, Field Utility, and Resonance: Distinguishing Hubris from Related Constructs 
It is unclear to what extent hubris overlaps with related constructs, such as narcissism or high 
levels of core self-evaluations (CSEs). Clearly, the latter speak to Gerring’s (1999) criterion of 
field utility, which is understood as a concept’s ability to describe a phenomenon in a way that 
related phenomena are not negatively affected. To identify differences and commonalities, we 
select narcissism and CSE because previous work has explicitly linked them to hubris (Hiller and 
Hambrick, 2005; Judge et al., 2009; Tracy and Robins, 2007). 
Narcissism. Strategy researchers define narcissistic CEOs “as those who have very inflated 
self-views and who are preoccupied with having those self-views continuously reinforced” 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007: 351). In social psychology, narcissism has often been classified 
as a personality trait. Zhu and Chen (2015: 2077) even view it as a “personality dimension for the 
general population.” The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) is a tool used to diagnose 
narcissism (Ames et al., 2006; Pincus and Lukowitsky, 2010). In contrast, Owen and Davidson 
(2009) describe hubris as a characteristic that can be acquired over time and relies on an external 
trigger, such as accession to power.  
There is some debate in the literature about whether narcissism and hubris are distinct 
constructs. Of Owen and Davidson’s diagnosis of 14 characteristics constituting hubris, seven 
relate directly to narcissism personality disorder (APA, 2013). While not an empirically validated 
construct, the Owen and Davidson guide to symptoms of hubris shows a strong overlap with 
narcissism, but its five unique characteristics offer support for some separation. (Appendix 2 
provides a comparison of APA and Owen and Wilson’s hubris indicators.) 
According to Kroll, Toombs and Wright (2000) and Picone et al. (2014), narcissism is an 
antecedent of hubris, though the authors do not provide empirical support for this assertion. Tang 
et al. (2015b) argue that narcissism and hubris are different constructs, using corporate social 
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responsibility activities as examples. Treating narcissism as an overarching latent construct that 
could manifest itself in the form of hubris seems to be more in line with the literature. Accordingly, 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007: 357) describe narcissism as “the more fundamental, ingrained 
property” that combines with external stimuli in producing hubris. 
Hyper-core self-evaluations. Core self-evaluations (CSEs) are assessments of an 
individual’s “own self-worth, competence, and capabilities” (Chang et al., 2012: 82), consisting of 
four traits: self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control. 
Originally introduced by Judge and colleagues to explain dispositional effects on job satisfaction 
(Erez and Judge, 2001; Judge et al., 2003; Judge et al., 2008; Judge et al., 1997), the CSE concept 
is now widely employed as evidenced by a meta-analysis identifying 149 studies that analyze CSEs 
(Chang et al., 2012). It is common to aggregate the single trait measures into an overarching CSE 
factor. A scale for direct measurement of CSEs developed by Judge, Erez, Bono and Thoresen 
(2003) has been validated in various studies (Judge, 2009; Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011; 
Stumpp et al., 2010). Hiller and Hambrick (2005) suggest that hyper-core self-evaluations (i.e., the 
high end of the CSE scale) are associated with the positive effects, but not with the negative effects 
of narcissism. Studying the CEOs of Major League Baseball organizations, Resick et al. (2009) 
identify narcissism and CSE as two separate constructs and provide evidence for Hiller and 
Hambrick’s (2005) argument. 
Trait or bias? The related constructs discussed in the preceding paragraphs build on a 
trait-based conceptualization of hubris. However, it is far from clear that hubris is a trait, a 
problem we now consider. A trait interpretation implies that not much can be done about it, as 
traits are formed through life stages, experience, socialization and partly through genes (Judge et 
al., 2009; Buyl et al., 2017). Instead, a bias interpretation offers room to maneuver and allows for 
debiasing techniques to be employed. 
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Behavioral decision research (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Russo and Schoemaker, 
1990) establishes overconfidence as an unstable, highly task-specific cognitive bias (Hayward et 
al., 2010). That interpretation runs counter to the trait-based approach found in social psychology, 
organizational behavior, and strategic management (Jonason et al., 2012; Pincus and Lukowitsky, 
2010; Lubit, 2002). Some studies treat hubris as a manifestation of extreme dispositional optimism 
(Hmieleski and Baron, 2009), which is deemed a relatively stable personality trait (Trevelyan, 
2008). Finally, some studies attempt to reconcile trait- and bias-oriented views. For example, 
Busenitz and Barney (1997) acknowledge task specificity in overconfidence, but argue that there 
are differences in the degree to which individuals are subject to this task-specific bias. 
While there is agreement on treating hubris as an individual-level construct, there is still a 
clear “lack of conceptual unity” (Powell et al., 2011: 1371). The construct has undergone variations 
in its definition and its division into components. This situation makes it difficult for researchers 
to build cumulative, comparable evidence. Nevertheless, recent studies converge towards its 
conceptualization as a bias (Picone et al., 2014). 
Given our review of related constructs above, and considering the different 
conceptualizations as trait or bias, hubris scores medium on the differentiation criterion. While the 
constructs of narcissism and hyper-CSEs have strong foundations in psychological research, they 
are related to hubris yet represent distinct constructs. Additionally, they align closely with the trait-
based conceptualizations of hubris; whereas we follow Picone et al. (2014) in their assessment of 
hubris as a bias. Even so, Hill, Kern and White (2012) argue that consistent use of terminology and 
the use of convergent measures are key attributes in concept formation, but hubris research falls 
short in these two aspects of conceptual differentiation. Regarding the field utility dimension, 
hubris scores low if we put it in the same basket with narcissism and CSEs, but it scores higher if 
we consider the recent trend toward conceptualizing hubris more narrowly as a bias rather than a 
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trait. Partly spurred by CEO scandals making headline news in the past two decades, the hubris 
concept has a genuine appeal beyond academic audiences implying good levels of resonance. In 
contrast, its related constructs overconfidence and narcissism seem to be less memorable. One 
explanation may be that these two related terms may have less emotionally loaded connotations.  
Theoretical Utility and Depth 
The remaining criteria to be assessed are theoretical utility and depth. The former relates to the 
added value of a concept, whereas the latter refers to its ability to capture phenomena of interest. 
The hubris concept has high theoretical utility; it links to theoretical phenomena of high interest, 
such as strategic decisions, investment decisions and risk taking (Li and Tang, 2013). For example, 
Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007) and Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) treatment of hubristic CEOs 
in merger and acquisition decision-making emphasizes the value of using hubris as a lens for 
analyzing strategic decisions. It ties together personality and environmental factors that affect the 
aforementioned areas. Finally, the depth criterion in Gerring’s (1999) framework refers to the 
question whether hubris can explain different phenomena more so than its related constructs. Our 
review of related constructs supports this notion.  
In summary, the hubris concept has several strengths as well as some shortcomings that 
need to be overcome (see Table 1). Gerring’s (1999) criteria should not be seen in isolation. For 
example, the theoretical and field utility of the hubris concept is only brought to bear if we solve 
the problems of differentiation. Therefore, we derive recommendations for future research in the 
next section. 
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Implications for Future Research 
Based on the critique presented in this article, we detail directions for future research below, 
divided into two categories, a) theory and construct development, and b) field-level issues in 
strategic leadership. 
Theory and Construct Development 
We have highlighted the high level of congruence and the occasional interchangeable use of 
“overconfidence” and “hubris,” at least conceptually. However, the common practice of using 
different terms for the same construct is not free from concerns. A clear definition, consistent 
terminology, and precise measurements are crucial in enabling systematic knowledge creation. 
Trait, bias, or something else? To make hubris a workable construct it may be helpful to 
explore other theoretical perspectives than the trait/bias distinction familiar in the literature of 
organizational behavior. Building on evolutionary psychology and evidence from neuroscience, 
McAdams and Pals (2006) suggest personality development beyond the inherited, genetic schema 
called the innate come in three layers: dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and life 
narratives. These give a more nuanced view of personality development than the trait/bias 
dichotomy allows. McAdams and Pals (2006) argue that dispositional traits provide templates for 
behavior that view what is innate as a predisposition but not a commandment. Characteristics 
adaptions add a learned response of those templates, including motives, virtues, values and goals. 
These adaptations influence future behavior, which then consolidates into meaning-making 
narratives that constitute identity. Haidt (2012) links these in the case of moral choices to the rapid 
responses in dual-process thinking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Stanovich and West, 2000). 
From a psychiatric direction, Trumbull (2010) argues that while pride may be a self-serving 
trait, it may have a prosocial purpose. She distinguishes pride from hubris, however, arguing that 
the latter, with its emphasis on the danger of retribution, leads to antisocial behavior. In discussing 
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destructive leadership, the model in Padilla et al. (2007) indicates that personal attributes of a leader 
interact with a conducive environment and susceptible followers in producing destructive 
behaviors (see also Thoroughgood et al., 2018). Could it be that such environmental factors also 
let latent elements in hubris off the leash? If so, then, in situations where the danger of retribution 
is low, we might expect to see hubris develop. 
Building on this literature, empirical research in strategic leadership might help identify 
differences in hubristic actions. For example, where hubris is seen in a succession of acquisitions 
– such as the case of RBS at the start of this article – research might show how such decisions rely 
upon dispositional traits of self-confidence built up through early successes. In what ways do they 
convert into characteristic adaptations? How do those adaptations gather into a life narrative of 
success that makes the hubristic leader susceptible to future “dark side” outcomes? 
Construct Clarity. Research on hubris presents many remarkably similar definitions 
between hubris and overconfidence (Hill et al., 2012: 189). Overconfident managers “overestimate 
their own ability” (Cassar and Gibson, 2007: 286), and hubristic ones are those who have 
“overconfidence about ability” (Shefrin, 2002: 227). Moreover, in the usage of unobtrusive 
indicators, there is significant overlap amongst the measures that are applied to study the effects of 
hubris and overconfidence. When measuring the way an executive is depicted in the media and/or 
annual reports, the studies refer either to hubris (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) or to 
overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Future research needs either to separate these 
concepts or to reduce confusion arising from the use of very different measures, so that findings of 
different studies are more comparable. Such work might start efforts to better validate hubris as a 
construct. 
Steps to Validate the Hubris Construct. Efforts to validate the hubris construct are 
needed. In some instances, such research may find that hubris is empirically indistinguishable from 
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one of its related constructs. Construct equivalence is not uncommon in the literature. Le et al. 
(2010) highlighted “empirical redundancy” as a problem, claiming that job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment may be difficult to disentangle empirically. Similarly, Wright et al. 
(2013) provide evidence for the equivalence between Grant’s (2008) pro-social motivation measure 
and a five-item global measure of a construct called “public service motivation” (Alonso and 
Lewis, 2001), which is widely used in public administration research. One indication for “empirical 
redundancy” in the hubris literature may be that the same measures are sometimes used for hubris 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) and narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Testing the 
characteristics that Owen and Davidson (2009) see as unique to hubris might be a starting point.2 
Similarly, taking the 15 factors that Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013) identify as describing 
narcissism might also help to separate the two constructs. 
To clarify these linkages, a validation study could mirror the procedures applied in Colquitt 
(2001), Bennett and Robinson (2000), and DeVellis (2011) (i.e., item development, content validity 
assessment, confirmatory factor analysis, convergent/discriminant validity, criterion related 
validity, and replication). A set of items generated to measure hubris could then be compared with 
widely used unobtrusive measures or with the high end of the CSE scale using confirmatory factor 
analysis, as suggested by Le et al. (2009). These steps would help assess the construct validity of 
hubris. Additionally, it should become standard practice in hubris research to combine unobtrusive 
measures, especially those used in strategic management studies (see section on measurement 
above), with a validated (self-reported) survey measure to strengthen the analysis to balance the 
strengths and weaknesses of both measurement approaches.  Better validation of the hubris 
construct would improve comparability. However, we suspect that it would still not tap the full 
potential of hubris research, because most prior studies have focused somewhat narrowly on the 
21 
 
performance of mergers and acquisitions, innovation, and entrepreneurship – a limitation that we 
address in our subsequent recommendations.  
Field-level Issues in Strategic Leadership 
Hubris research needs to extend its scope to fully exploit its theoretical and field utility, by shedding 
light on a variety of topics in the fields of corporate governance and strategic leadership. One 
criticism of the hubris literature is its frequent focus on CEOs, neglecting the fact that managerial 
decisions are embedded in a complex network of power relations (Maule and Hodgkinson, 2003). 
Hubris may also affect a) internal processes that influence organizational outcomes only indirectly; 
b) the context of decision-making, including whether leadership is centralized or distributed in the 
organization; c) relationships between managers and boards; and d) relationships between directors 
and investors or other constituencies.  
Internal Processes. As actions of boards set the tone for organizational culture, lower-level 
managers and employees may be affected. Employees who perceive managers as hubristic could 
be less willing to accept them as role models. This in turn may negatively affect management’s 
ability to implement corporate strategies and may negatively affect the leader-follower relationship. 
For example, Wang et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence for increased leader efficacy when 
follower behavior is positive – which is unlikely to occur if the leader is perceived as a hubristic 
person. Future research could pay more attention to intermediate variables, such as employees’ 
motivation and group decision-making, and look for signs of behavior that mirror boards and senior 
managers.  
Moreover, managerial hubris may have positive effects on employee motivation. Gervais 
and Goldstein (2007) show in a formal model that individuals who overestimate their abilities can 
also overinvest in effort. Therefore, employees may perceive hubristic managers as highly 
motivated and committed to work, which may positively influence the employees’ own motivation. 
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This raises three important questions: First, how does managerial hubris influence the employees’ 
organizational commitment and motivation to contribute to the success of the firm? Second, what 
other employee outcomes might be affected by a manager’s hubris? Third, under which conditions 
will such effects be positive or negative for firm performance? Ultimately, hubris research could 
contribute to an increased understanding of the interaction between cognition and emotion in 
strategic leadership.  
Decision-Making Context. Research on hubris has also identified the decision context as 
an important variable moderating the impact of hubris on decision-making. For example, studies 
on the effects of hubris on entrepreneurship and on innovation emphasize the distinct decision 
context. The decisions of entrepreneurs to start a new venture or managers to innovate are 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, complexity, and long feedback delays (Hayward et 
al., 2006). Due to bounded rationality, this decision context makes it particularly difficult to 
evaluate all decision alternatives comprehensively and cautiously (Zahra et al., 2006). Therefore, 
cognitive biases such as hubris may lead to a “utility of non-rational decision-making” (Busenitz 
and Barney, 1997: 9). In other words, it may be better to be overly confident of one’s abilities and 
judgments than to procrastinate. Hence, this stream of literature puts a stronger emphasis on the 
beneficial effects of hubris than the studies on mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, the branch of 
the literature studying hubris in mergers and acquisitions conceives of a differently characterized 
decision-making context in which top managers and CEOs operate. According to Malmendier and 
Tate (2005b) the latter is characterized by low-quality feedback and rare occasions in which the 
manager receives challenging feedback. Additionally, this research points to recent success as an 
important driver of hubris (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
Therefore, the explicit decision context is a variable that needs to be considered when 
investigating the effects of hubris. Taking this idea further, future research could develop 
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integrative models of characteristics of the decision context including, e.g., the firm’s internal 
environment, differences in organizational structures, and industry features. Such models could 
lead to testable hypotheses on the effects of hubris in different decision contexts. 
Relationships between Managers and Boards. Hubris has been associated with high pay 
and pay inequality between the CEO and other employees (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), which 
can create unrest in the workforce (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Additionally, hubris has been related 
to self-centered CEO depictions in the press and in annual reports (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
Most research on hubris focuses on individual managers as decision-makers. However, the 
behavioral theory of the firm and recent approaches to socially distributed decision-making (e.g., 
Gavetti et al., 2007) emphasize the role of coalitions and group decision-making. The strategic 
actions of corporations often do not simply reflect the choices made by CEOs or top managers 
(Powell et al., 2011). Thus, it would be a worthwhile endeavor to analyze how hubris at the 
individual level affects perceptions of outside directors, board dynamics, and group decision-
making, especially in light of concerns about whether boards can be effective monitors of managers 
(Boivie et al., 2016). Cases of catastrophic failure like those in the financial crisis often arise 
through the collective agency of boards and top management teams. That is, they arise not just 
through the excess of messianic leaders, that is, not just on the dark side of heroic leadership. As 
fraud and corruption can become normalized and then institutionalized (Ashforth and Anand, 
2003), we wonder if and then how hubris might spread, and whether by contagion or something 
more like collusion similar to developments in destructive leadership (Padilla et al. 2007).3 
As hubris can lead to value-destroying decisions, it is important to think about 
countermeasures that limit negative effects. While the literature based in agency theory pays 
considerable attention to mitigating imperious behavior of CEOs through control mechanisms, it 
lacks detailed analyses of the links between them and hubris. In analyzing the effects on firm 
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outcomes, both board independence and director diversity as controls over managerial excess have 
had equivocal results (see Dalton and Aguinis, 2013: for a discussion). But future research might 
consider how they alter internal board processes and decisions in ways that help control the “dark 
side” effects of hubris, as well as shed light on directors’ service role and how it steers executive 
hubris toward “bright side” outcomes in innovation and entrepreneurship. Research that used 
similar approaches and instruments in large firms and entrepreneur-led enterprises might help 
identify the similarities and differences in conditions that lead to hubristic actions. 
While such board-internal studies have tended to be qualitative and interpretative, settling 
on more robust dimensions for the general concept of hubris would give such research stronger 
analytic power. For example, the psychological literature provides evidence that hubristic 
individuals seek and act on feedback in a different manner than non-hubristic individuals. Research 
has shown that decision quality is negatively affected when individuals assume positions of power 
because their willingness to consider advice declines (See et al., 2011). Similarly, Fast et al. (2012) 
show, in a series of experiments, that power is likely to induce overconfident decisions. New 
research within the boardroom could help identify the conditions under which boardroom feedback, 
coming from a notional peer group, might moderate the effects of hubris. When exploring diversity 
in top management teams and boards, increasing cognitive diversity is likely to generate different 
opinions and more discussion about decision alternatives (Rost and Osterloh, 2010). Future 
research could analyze the extent to which cognitive diversity counteracts hubris in managerial 
decision-making.  
Finally, counterfactual thinking and learning are two phenomena that may counterbalance 
hubris. According to Simon and Shrader (2012: 303), counterfactual thinking causes decision-
makers to think about “how an outcome could turn out differently from what is expected.” 
Moreover, Aktas et al. (2009) suggest that the signals CEOs receive from investors trigger learning. 
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As a result, CEOs are likely to bid less aggressively in the future. However, the measures that 
encourage these phenomena are still unclear. Future research is needed to identify such measures 
and evaluate their effects. 
Relationships between Directors, Investors, and Other Constituencies. Another control 
on managerial excess well documented in the literature is increasing the power of shareholders, 
through both voting rights and an expansion of shareholder activism. While activism has been 
studied as a form of power, much less is understood about its effects on hubris. A recent policy 
agenda in many countries advocates investor stewardship, which McNulty and Nordberg (2016) 
identify as having links to psychological ownership and commitment. In adopting such a stance, 
shareholders take a collaborative approach instead of the more common adversarial one in activism, 
but for which there is little empirical research. A better understanding of the dimensions of hubris 
would help such research identify ways to contain the negative effects of hubris in CEOs while 
encouraging the beneficial ones, or to identify how investors might inadvertently feed the negative 
side of hubris in pushing for higher growth, leading to counterproductive mergers or acquisitions. 
A related stream of research has sought to examine effects of social activism on boards and 
corporate decision-making (e.g., Rehbein et al., 2013), though without exploring specifically how 
such interactions influence the moderation of the downsides of hubris. One research stream linked 
to corporate political activity (Hillman et al., 2004) has considered how senior managers and boards 
seek to influence the institutional environment, while another has explored a political dimension to 
corporate social responsibility and the production of social goods through corporate actions 
(Scherer et al., 2016). Both streams examine phenomena where hubris is likely to appear in either 
dark or bright side ways. 
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Conclusions 
This article has sought, first, to clarify the often-muddy conceptualizations of hubris in the literature 
of management and strategic leadership, and then to propose ways of understanding the constructs 
in use to assess hubris-in-action. As we have shown, hubris presents a managerial 
dilemma often leading to undesired outcomes. However, tackling the dark side of hubris requires 
striking a fine balance because, as we have seen, under certain conditions hubris can also deliver 
value. Further research can build on this to identify the motivations and traits that can detect and 
classify hubris. Doing so will help guide the work of directors and policymakers, as well as adding 
to our understanding of strategic leadership. Research that examines the “bright side” of 
entrepreneurial hubris can remind us that small initial investments can have great returns. In effect, 
investors can regard such investments as call options, with limited downside and unlimited upside 
– i.e., benefiting diversified investors and a small number of successful hubristic entrepreneurs, 
while harming a great number of unsuccessful hubristic entrepreneurs. In this sense, hubris remains 
a double-edged sword that is difficult to handle, but future research may find ways to inform a 
better handling of hubris in organizations.  
Our analysis leaves many questions open to further research. If the basis of hubris might be 
something other than a long-established trait, or even a bias contingent upon triggers, we have 
suggested avenues to approach how hubris develops, perhaps as adaptations across a number of 
dimensions or the unfolding of a modified life story (McAdams and Pals, 2006).  
Doing so will not solve the problems in governance and leadership, of course. Whether 
strategic decisions have beneficial or disastrous outcomes – or something in between – is likely to 
be a function of contingencies beyond the concept of hubris itself. But a better understanding of 
the roles that actors play, and how and why they play them, can contribute to better decisions and 
better policy.
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1 Owen later came to describe hubris as a trait, rather than a disorder. See the magazine article 
Owen D. (2016) Hubris Syndrome. Enterprise Risk. London: Institute of Risk Management, 20-
24. 
2 The five (of 14) characteristics Owen and Davidson (2009) claim to be unique to hubris are 5) 
identification with the states or organization; 6) tendency to speak in third person; 10) unshakable 
belief in ultimate vindication; 12) restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness; and 13) tendency 
to allow vision to obviate need to weigh risk. However, their point 12 is actually very much like 
Antisocial Personality Disorder points 3 and 5, which Owen and Davidson assign to their point 
11: Loss of contact with reality. This should be borne in mind when following our suggestion of 
using O&D’s criteria analytically. In a later article, Owen and colleagues claim only four unique 
characteristics of hubris, not including point 12: see Claxton G, Owen D and Sadler-Smith E. 
(2015) Hubris in leadership: A peril of unbridled intuition? Leadership 11: 57-78. 
3 We are indebted to a reviewer for suggesting this insight. The anonymity of the review process 
makes it impossible to give full recognition of the source of the idea.  
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Table 1 - The hubris concept, evaluated using Gerring’s (1999) dimensions 
Dimension Explanation Evaluation   Section Heading 
Familiarity 
How familiar is the 
concept? (to lay or 
academic audiences) 
High   
Familiarity: 
Understanding Hubris 
Differentiation 
How differentiated are 
instances and attributes 
from other similar 
concepts? How bounded, 
how operationalizable is 
the concept? 
Medium; blurs with 
hyper-CSE, excessive 
overconfidence, and 
narcissism 
  
Differentiation, Field 
Utility, and 
Resonance: 
Distinguishing Hubris 
from Related 
Constructs 
Resonance 
Does the chosen term 
resonate? 
High 
Field utility 
How useful is the concept 
within a field of related 
instances and attributes? 
Moderate, owing to 
lack of differentiation; 
trait/bias difficult to 
settle 
Parsimony 
How parsimonious is a) the 
term itself, b) its list of 
defining attributes? 
Low, owing to 
overlaps with other 
concepts 
  
Parsimony and 
Coherence: Measuring 
Hubris 
Coherence 
How logically related are 
instances and attributes? 
Low, owing to lack of 
clarity over trait/bias 
status 
Theoretical 
utility 
How useful is the concept 
within a wider field of 
inferences? 
High, if differentiation 
problems can be 
overcome 
  
Theoretical Utility and 
Depth 
Depth 
How many properties are 
shared by instances under 
definition? 
High, as it is often 
used as a measure of a 
greater or excessive 
form of another 
construct 
Note: This table illustrates the strengths of the hubris concept and the challenges that need to be 
overcome. The last column of the table highlights the section headings where the different 
dimensions are discussed. 
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Appendix 1 - Overview of selected, illustrative hubris studies   
Study 
(chronological order) 
Main  
Finding 
Hubris  
Measure 
Managerial 
Relevance 
Panel A: Hubris and Acquisitions / Financial Decisions 
 
Roll (1986) 
 
Hubris as acquisition motive  
 
Acquisition premium  
 
Strategic 
decision-making  
Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) 
CEOs paying higher premiums 
for acquisitions   
Recent performance (stock 
returns), self-importance 
(compensation relative to 
second best paid employee), 
media praise (favorable 
mentions in business press)  
Strategic 
decision-making; 
board vigilance 
established as a 
moderator  
Brown and Sarma 
(2007) 
Hubristic CEOs more likely to 
engage in acquisitions, tending 
to make value-destroying 
decisions  
Media coverage  Strategic 
decision-making  
Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) 
Hubristic CEOs more likely to 
engage in acquisitions, making 
value-destroying decisions  
Lengths of option holdings 
(overconfidence present if 
options “in-the-money” and 
not exercised)  
Strategic 
decision-making  
Li and Tang (2010) CEO duality coupled with 
hubris leads to higher risk 
taking  
z-score for a subjective 
evaluation of firm 
performance minus the z for 
return on sales (ROS)  
Strategic risk 
taking and board 
composition  
Ferris et al. (2013) Overconfidence is related to 
(1) number of offers made by 
a CEO, (2) frequencies of non-
diversifying and diversifying 
acquisitions, (3) use of cash to 
finance a merger deal 
 
Media coverage 
 
Strategic 
decisions and 
investment 
 
Cormier et al. 
(2016) 
Hubris related to financial 
misreporting 
 
CEO received prizes, awards 
or accolades; analysts issued 
buy recommendations; media 
coverage; firm was part of 
index covered by two or 
more financial analysts 
 
Executive team 
composition 
 
Panel B: Hubris and Entrepreneurial Decisions 
 
Busenitz and 
Barney (1997) 
  
 
Entrepreneurs overestimate 
probability of being right  
 
Two questions: (1) identify a 
correct answer to a given 
question, (2) rate their own 
confidence in their answer  
 
Investment 
decisions  
Camerer and 
Lovallo (1999) 
Overconfident individuals 
(entrepreneurs) put 
disproportionate weight on 
own judgment versus 
objective information 
Experiment; overconfidence 
in hypothetical market entry 
decisions 
 
Investment 
decisions 
 
30 
 
 
Hmieleski and 
Baron (2009) 
High optimism associated with 
low revenue growth, low 
employment in new ventures 
 
Hubris as manifestation of 
extreme dispositional 
optimism; Life Orientation 
Test–Revised (LOT-R) 
(Scheier et al., 1994) 
 
Founding team 
composition 
 
Simon and Shrader 
(2012) 
Counterfactual thinking 
facilitates entrepreneurs’ 
decision to start a business; 
may lead to insufficient 
analysis, reducing the chance 
of success 
 
Overconfidence determined 
through a series of interviews 
 
Investment 
decisions 
 
Panel C: Hubris and Innovation 
 
Englmaier (2010) 
  
 
Overconfidence can represent 
commitment to stronger 
pursuit of innovation  
 
Theoretical model, 
underestimation of 
probability of bad events  
 
Executive team 
composition  
Galasso and 
Simcoe (2011) 
Overconfident CEOs, 
managers likely to pursue 
more innovation in large and 
small firms  
Options “in-the-money” and 
not exercised   
Executive team 
composition  
Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012) 
Effect of overconfidence on 
managerial innovation 
stronger in innovative 
industries  
Average “moneyness” of 
options: stock price divided 
by the estimated strike price 
minus 1  
Executive team 
composition  
Tang et al. (2015a) Effect of overconfidence 
stronger in industries with 
high concentration   
Media coverage  Executive team 
composition  
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Appendix 2 – Hubris and psychological disorders 
The table below maps the characteristics of hubris in Owen and Davidson (2009) to the 
American Psychological Association’s diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(APD); Histrionic Personality Disorder (HPD); and Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). 
Table 1 - Hubris and personality disorder compared 
 Owen & Davidson (2009), with O&D’s 
assessment of links to APA criteria 
APA (2013) diagnostic criteria for 
personality disorders 
1. Narcissistic propensity to see world primarily as 
arena in which to exercise power, seek glory; 
NPD.6  
NPD 6: Is interpersonally 
exploitative; takes advantage of 
others to achieve own ends 
2. Predisposition to take actions likely to cast the 
individual in a good light, enhance image; NPD.1  
NPD 1: Has grandiose sense of self-
importance; exaggerates 
achievements; expects to be seen as 
superior 
3. Disproportionate concern with image NPD.3  NPD 3: Believes self to be special, 
unique; only to be understood by 
high-status people 
4. Messianic way of talking; tendency to exaltation; 
NPD.2  
NPD 2: Preoccupied with fantasies 
of unlimited success, power 
5. Identification with nation or organization; 
individual’s own outlook and interests identical to 
nation, organization (unique)  
 
6. Tendency to speak in third person or use royal 
“we” (unique)  
 
7. Excessive confidence in own judgement; 
contempt for advice or criticism NPD.9  
NPD 9: Shows arrogant behavior, 
attitudes 
8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of 
omnipotence NPD.1 and 2 combined  
NPD 1: Has grandiose sense of self-
importance; exaggerates 
achievements; expects to be seen as 
superior 
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NPD 2: Preoccupied with fantasies 
of unlimited success, power 
9. Belief the only court they answer to is History or 
God; not accountable to colleagues or public 
opinion NPD.3  
NPD 3: Believes self to be special, 
unique; only to be understood by 
high-status people 
10. Unshakable belief that in that court they will be 
vindicated (unique)  
 
11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with 
progressive isolation; APD 3 and 5  
 
12. Restlessness, recklessness, impulsiveness (unique)  APD 3: Impulsivity or failure to plan 
ahead 
APD 5: Reckless disregard for safety 
of self or others 
13. Tendency to allow a “broad vision” about moral 
rectitude of proposed course, no need to consider 
practicality, cost or outcomes (unique)  
 
14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong 
because too much self-confidence has led the 
leader not to worry about the nuts and bolts of 
policy; HPD.5 
HPD 5: Has a style of speech that is 
excessively impressionistic and 
lacking in detail. 
NB: The grayed cells reflect characteristics O&D claim as unique, plus one (11) we think O&D 
mistakenly identify as characteristics of antisocial personality disorder, which are more associated with 
O&D’s “unique” point 12. 
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